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a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. ; 
OKLAND LTD.,INC., ! 
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Case No. 86-314-CA 
Appeal from a Summary Judgment in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings, Judge Presiding 
(District Court No. C84-29U) 
Plaintiff-respondent's First Security Financial Response to 
Defendant-appellant's, Okland Ltd, Inc., Petition for Rehearing 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals and this Court's letter dated March 7, 1988 inviting 
a response to Appellant Okland Ltd., Inc., (hereinafter 
Appellant) petition for rehearing, Respondent First Security 
Financial (hereinafter Respondent), hereby responds to 
said petition for rehearing as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO STATE ANY FACTS OR 
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT IT'S CONTENTION THAT 
THERE SHOULD BE A REAHEARING ON THIS MATTER 
Appellant has not stated any new facts or authority 
for which this court could grant it's petition for rehearing. 
Appellant has only restated its unproved version of the 
facts as alleged in it's brief and it's supplemental filing 
of recent authorities. There has been no newly discovered 
evidence nor any new authority which would change this Court's 
Decision rendered February 10, 1988. This decision is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference and marked 
as respondent's Exhibit A. 
Respondent further asks the court for a further award 
of costs and attorneys fees in this matter as it feels that 
this petition is filed only for delay. This "can be allowed 
pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ON FEBRUARY 10, 1988 IS PROPER. 
A. Was the defense of "Whether the agreement is void and un-
enforceable as a pently or otherwise contained unconscionable 
liquidated damages provisions11 properly before the trial court? 
Appellant contends that the above defense was properly 
presented at the trial court level and thus it was improper for 
the Utah Court of Appeals not to consider it on review. The 
decision states that the above defense "was not raised before the 
trial court and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Trayner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984); James v. Preston, 
746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987)." 
Appellant contends that by it raising this issue in 
it's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent/Plaintiff!s Motion 
for Summary Judgment it was properly before the trial court. This 
Memorandum is not a verified statement. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that: 
"(b) HOW PRESENTED. Every defense, in law or 
fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether 
a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, 
(3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, 
(5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. . . .If 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further 
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states that: 
,f(h) WAIVER OF DEFENSES. A party waives all 
defenses and objections which he does not present 
either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if 
he has made no motion, in his answer or reply,. . ." 
Appellant never raised this defense in any responsive pleading 
to the complaint or in any motion. Appellant did in fact amend 
its answer to respondent/plaintiffs complaint in order to raise 
additional defenses but did not place this defense in it's 
amended answer. (Amended Answer R.189-96). Appellant had ample 
opportunity to present this defense properly in the trial court 
which it failed to do. It is clear that Appellant waived this 
defense. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed this issue many 
times and has ruled each time that if a defense is not properly 
raised in the lower court, it is waived. Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 
1352, 1353 (Utah, 1986). In Valley Bank and Trust Company v. 
Wilken, 668 P.2d 493, (Utah, 1983), a similar issue was raised 
by a debtor. In that case a creditor brought an action against 
some debtors on two promissory notes and the trial court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of the plaintiff. One of the debtors 
then appealed alleging that the trial court: should have allowed 
its defense of failure of consideration which was raised for the 
first time in debtor's affidavit to plaintiff!s motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Supreme Court held that this defense should 
have been raised by the debtor in its answer to plaintiff's complaint 
or by motion. In affirming the trial court the Supreme Court stated: 
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"It is not the office of an affidavit in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment 
to provide a means of introducing defenses 
which have not been raised by the answer or 
by proper motion. Rule 12(b), U.R.C.P. 
Affidavits are proper to address factual 
matters relating to issues already framed. 
Since the defense was not properly raised 
she (appellant) waived it.11 at 494. 
Appellantsmemorandum in opposition to Respondent/plaintifffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment is not a proper place to raise 
this defense. Memorandums are pleadings, unverified, which 
are used to argue points and authorities in support of the 
then existing propositions, defenses and claims, not to raise 
new defenses and present new unproven facts. 
Appellant again tries to raise new issues based 
upon unproven facts. Appellant states in his petition that 
Respondents "actual damages11 are only $1,800.00. Appellants 
support for this allegation is it's own brief filed herein. 
There is no other support. Respondents damages, which are 
all proper under the agreement between the parties,is fully 
set forth in the Summary Judgment entered by the trial court. 
A true and exact copy of which is attached herein as exhibit B 
and incorporated herein by this reference. Appellant provided 
no proof in the trial court to raise an issue that the damages 
claimed by the plaintiff are not proper. 
It is good at this point to remind this coutt that 
Appellant fully admits his liability under this agreement. 
(Appellant's brief, pg. 5) 
Therefore this court was proper is not addressing 
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the issue of whether the agreement was void as a penalty or contained 
an unconscionable liquidated damage provision. It is also the 
opinion of the Respondent that even if this court was to review 
the allegations of the Appellant, the decision would not change. 
Appellant has set forth no facts to support its contentions# 
B. Did the Appellant assert any defenses under Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code? 
Appellant clearly misses the point of the court's 
decision in this matter dated February 10, 1988. This court 
stated: 
"Futhermore, Okland has not asserted any 
specific (emphasis added) defenses or counterclaims 
as a debtor under Article 9. Given that failure 
it makes no difference if the contract at issue 
is either a lease or a sales agreement.ff [See 
attached exhibit A, pg 6] 
Appellant still has not asserted any specific defenses 
or counterclaims as a debtor under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code or how any of the defenses would apply to 
this situation. It is the Respondents position that none would 
apply even if the agreement was ever construed as a security 
agreement and not a lease. Appellant has presented no facts 
contary to this position. 
Appellant has a burden to present some evidence in the 
trial court to establish his allegations and defenses. This 
is its burden of proof. The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975) that: 
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"The proponent of a proposition has two 
burdens relative to his proof: to produce 
evidence which proves or tends to prove the 
proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier 
of fact that his evidence is more credible or 
entitled to the greater weight, (footnote omitted)'1 
Appellant failed to produce any competent evidence 
at the trial court level and was thus unable to persuade the 
trier of fact that its evidence was more credible that the 
evidence produced by the Respondent. The trial court can 
only look at the evidence properly before it. 
C. Is the Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc., v. 
Larson Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d 483, (Utah 1986) distinguishable 
from the present matter? 
Appellant relies very heavily upon the Colonial Leasing 
case, infra. It wishes this court to use Colonial1s rationale 
as a means to remand this case back to the trial court for 
further proceeds and to allow parol evidence in to show that 
the agreement was not a fftrue lease11 but an agreement " intended 
as one for security" and thus covered by Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
There are two basic reasons why Colonial Leasing 
is not controlling. The first reason is that the facts in both 
cases are very different. In Colonial Leasing the creditor 
entered into an agreement with a debtor called a "lease". The 
debtor defaulted on the agreed payments. The creditor repossesed 
the equipment under the agreement and the trial court granted judg 
to the creditor for the amount due under the agreement, less the 
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proceeds from the sale of the equipment after repossession. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter back 
to the trial court for it to allow parol evidence into the 
case to determine whether the agreement was in fact a lease 
or an agreement intended only as security and governed by 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This was asked for 
by the debtor because the debtor believed that the creditor 
"failed to comply with Article 9 requirements in disposing of the 
collateral, Larsen (debtor) contends that Colonial (creditor) 
was therefore, precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment.ff 
This is not the facts of this case. The equipment has never been 
'fep'ossesed or disposed of by the Respondent. Since the 
equipment has never been repossesed, Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code would not play a substanial role upon default. 
As stated by this court in its February 10. 1988 decision: 
"Therefore, First Security was within its rights,; 
even as a secured creditor, in not repossessing and 
selling the "collateral1,1 and then applying those 
proceeds to the debt." at pg.5 
It appears that repossession is an operative fact distinguishing 
Colonial Leasing and the present matter. 
The second reason is that even if it was remanded 
back to the trial court to allow parol evidence as allegedly 
exists by the Appellant,it would not change the outcome of 
the matter. Summary Judgment is appropriate, even if the facts 
in dispute,as contended by Appellant, yere allowed, it would 
not change the case and the moving party would be entitled to 
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D. Was the matter reviewed in a "light most favorable to the 
Appellant,"the party against whom the summary judgment was granted? 
It is true that when the appellate court reviews the 
trial courts granting of a motion for Summary Judgment, the facts 
must be viewed in a light favorable to the losing party, but it 
also states that when it appears from the pleadings on file, 
the affidavits filed in support and in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment and hearing counsel for both sides and there 
still appears to be no genuine issue of material fact, then 
summary judgment is not only proper, but required. Burningham v. 
Ott, 525 P.2d 620, (Utah, 1974). 
This is the case here. Appellant never did present 
any evidence in support of his allegations and clearly failed 
to meet its burden of proof and pursuasion. There is nothing 
in the record to contradict the facts placed in the record 
by the Respondent. The only facts in the record are those 
presented by the Respondent. It seems clear that after reviewing 
the facts in the record, the trial court had no alternative but 
to grant the summary judgment. Respondant further alleges that 
even if the facts as alleged by the Appellant were proved and allowed 
into the record, it would still not change the outcome. 
Appellant is still trying to relitigate this case on 
the appellate level. It again attacks the affidavits of the 
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trial court. 
E. Would reasonable minds differ on the calulations of damages? 
Appellant suggests that the calulations by the Respondent 
are not for a "sum certain11. Clearly the sums set out in the 
Summary Judgment are for a sum certain. Appellant has not 
shown or explained why they are not for a "sum certain.11 There 
is not an issue here. 
CONCLUSION 
This court's decision in this matter is entirely 
correct and proper. There is no need for a rehearing as it 
would just delay the matter further. 
Appellant has not met his burden of proof or pursuasion. 
on any of his allegations or defenses. Summary judgment rendered 
by the trial court was proper and Respondent respectfully asks 
this court to deny Appellant's petition for rehearing and that 
Respondent be award its costs and attorneys fees. 
DATED this li/ day of March, 1988. 
ffVAg 
ones 
for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered four (4) 
copies of the forgoing Response to Petition for Rehearing to 
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City , Utah 8-+II1 UIJL* j p i- 'la re 
i ^ih^2-KyL 
Atttorne ? <t>nes for Respondent 
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First Security Financial, 
a Utah, corporation, . 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Okland Ltd., Inc., and 
Bradshaw-Ferrin Development 
Company, now known as 
Bradshaw Development ( 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellant 
Doug Bradshaw, Robert M. 
Simonsen, City Gate 
Condominium Partnership, 
a limited partnership, and 
John Does 3 -5, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 860314-CA 
F I L E D 
FEB 101988 
Timothy.... Snca 
Clerk of the Court 
Uteh Court of Appeals 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant okland Ltd., inc. (Okland) appeals from a summj i" 
judgment granted plaintiff, First Security Financial (First 
Security), for Okland9s breach of an equipment lease 
agreement. Okland claims on appeal that the trial court erred 
in granting the motion for summary judgment because geniune 
issues of material fact existed, or, alternatively, the lease 
should be declared void as a penalty and the judgment reversed. 
On September 31, 1981, Okland and Bradshaw-Ferrin 
Development Co. (BFDC) executed an equipment lease agreement 
lessees, agreeing to pay certain sums to Murray First Thrift 
(MFT), lessor, for lease of personal property. MFT 
simultaneously purchased the property described in tin If"1 
EXHIBIT A 
A-i 
precluding granting of summary judgement. Those issues were: 
(1) whether the lease was a security agreement; and (2) the 
unavailability of documentation regarding the purchase price of 
the equipment. Okland also sought leave to amend its answer to 
the complaint. 
On September 9, 1985, the court granted Okland*s motion to 
amend its answer. The amended answer allegetd as affirmative 
defenses that plaintiffs claim was barred by failure of 
consideration and by the fact that the lease agreement was 
really a security agreement. On September 23, 1985, the court 
granted First Security's motion for summary judgment against 
Okland for $33,893.23 and found that there were no factual 
issues regarding whether the contract was a lease, security 
agreement or contract of guarantee and no evidence that First 
Security had failed to mitigate damages. 
I • 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
We first consider whether the trial court correctly granted 
First Security's motion for summary judgment against Okland. 
We will review the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and determine if the undisputed 
facts before the court establish First Security's right to 
judgment as a matter of law. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
Okland claims that there are two factual disputes 
precluding summary judgment: (1) the damages recoverable under 
the lease agreement; and (2) whether the lease agreement was 
actually a security agreement. 
A. 
We first address the question of damages recoverable under 
the agreement. First Security filed an affidavit in support of 
its motion for summary judgment signed by an officer of First 
Security. The affidavit states that the affiant is an officer 
of First Security and that he has access to its files and has 
personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the affidavit. 
The affidavit further avers that the equipment listed in the 
lease agreement was delivered to defendants and had not been 
repossessed by First Security. The affidavit concludes by 
itemizing amounts due under the lease for monthly payments, 
1984 and 1985 property taxes, late charges and interest accrued 
as of the date of the affidavit. A later affidavit of counsel 
set forth attorney fees sought by First Security. 
860314-CA 3 
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purchase the property for a nominal sura ii,( the end of the 
term. Okland's memorandum in opposition to the motion fo 
summary judgment includes portions of a deposition of a former 
employee of NET, which supports the assertion that the 
transaction was really intended as a secured sale, not a true 
lease. Okland cites Colonial Leasing Cn. of Hew England. Inc. 
v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as 
controlling precedent. In Colonial Leasing, the trial court 
excluded parol evidence offered to prove that an ostensible 
lease agreement was actually intended to be a sales and 
security agreement subject to the provisions of Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded, stating that "whether a lease was intended as 
security for a sale is a question to be determined on the facts 
of each case, as is the issue of whether the nature of the 
document raises questions of fact that preclude summary 
judgment." I£. at 488. Okland argues, therefore, that this 
case should be reversed and remanded for a factual 
determination of whether a security agreement was inli ii I il 
the parties. However, the purpose of such a factual 
determination must be examined. In FMA Financial Corp. v. 
Pro-Printers. 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a trial court's determination that a lease of personal 
property was actually a secured sale and, therefore, subject to 
the provisions of Article 9. The Court further found that 
plaintiff in that case had failed to properly comply with the 
default provisions of Article 9 and denied it a deficiency 
judgment. Plaintiff's breach consisted of a failure to disp 
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. 
In this case, the putative secured party, First security, 
did not repossess the "collateral*" prior to filing suit nor at 
any time during the proceedings before us. Furthermore! 
secured party is not. required by Article 9 to liquidate 
collateral prior to pursuing other remedies. . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-9-501 (1980) provides that a secured party's rights upon 
default are alternative. A secured party "has an option to 
pursue any of the parties liable on [a] note, which is secured 
solely by personal property, and may also, at its option, 
ignore that security and satisfy its judgment from other 
property in the hands of the judgment debtor." Kennedy v. Bank 
of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 881, 884 (Utah 1979). Therefore, First 
Security was within its rights, even as a secured creditor, in 
not repossessing and selling the "collateral," and then 
applying those proceeds to the debt. The cases -cited by Okland 
all involve failure of a secured creditor to properly care for 
:)i: dispose of collateral. However, the duties of a secured 
creditor to protect and properly sell collateral do not arise 
until the secured party has exercised its right to repossess 
the collateral. North Carolina Naf1 Bank v. Sharoe, 35 N.C. 
860314-CA 5 
AS 
The trial court*s judgment is, affirmed* 
to First Security, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Gregory B?T Orme, Judg 
5%s935*^e<§£ 
Norman H. Jackson; Judge 
e 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
OKLAND LTD., INC. and 
BRADSHAW-FERRIN DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, now known as 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants 
OKLAND LTD., INC., 
Third-Party 
Plainciff, 
vs. 
DOUG BRADSHAW, BOB SIMONSEN, 
CITY GATE CONDOMINIUM PARTNERSHIP, 
a limited partnership and 
JOHN DOES 1 - 5 , 
Third-Party 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-2941 
Assigned: Judge Bill] 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant 
Okland Ltd., Inc., came on regularly for hearing before the Honorab 
EXHIBIT B 
A * 
Judith Billings, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, 
September 23, 1985, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. P la int i f f appears: 
by and through its attorney of record, Kyle W. Jones, and 
defendant Okland Ltd., Inc. appeared by and through its attorney 
of record, John Michael Coombs. No other parties appeared on 
behalf of any of the other parties in this matter. The court, 
after hearing the arguments in this matter, having reviewed the 
pleadings on file herein, finds that there is no factual issue 
with respect to whether or not the contract involved is a lease 
or a security agreement or a contract of guarantee and that 
plaintiff has properly pursued its remedies and that there is no 
evidence to support defendant's allegation that the plaintiff 
failed to mitigate its damages thereby the court enters this 
Judgment as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff1s Motion for Summary Judgment against defendant Okland 
Ltd., Inc., be granted and that plaintiff be awarded Judgment in 
the following amounts: 
$24,030.89 amount remaining to be paid under contract 
363.52 property taxes for 1984; 
341.80 property taxes for 1985; 
1,201.25 late charges pursuant to contract; 
6,055.77 interest; 
1,900.00 attorney's fees 
$33,893.23 Total Judgment 
with interest on the total Judgment at eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum as provided by the contract from the date of this Judgment 
until paid, plus after accruing costs, attorney's fees and the 
expenses of location, repossession and sale of the leased equipme* 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiff be granted all necessary writs and orders necessary to 
recover its leased equipment if and when it is located. 
DATED this /^ day of September, 1985. 
BY THE COURT 
40 71 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS Code • Co Pro«o, Utt» 
judgment as a matter of law. Based upon 
various documents (including an affidavit) and 
memoranda on file, the trial court found as 
follows: the "Bryner Clinic Employees Profit 
Sharing Plan* was organized in 1968, and the 
'Bryner Clinic, Inc. Employees Pension 
Trust* was organized in 1977; Howard C. 
Sharp, Max W. Steele, and Steven W. Bergs-
tedt are the trustees for both entities; and the 
deed to 'Bryner Clinic Employees' Profit 
Sharing and Pension Trusts* was considered 
by respondents to be jointly owned by the two 
entities for which they served as trustees. The 
court concluded that the actual name of the 
grantee, if incorrect, was not a material defect 
as to invalidate the deed since '[sufficient 
extrinsic evidence exists to allow proper iden-
tification of the intended grantee.' The court 
thereupon granted respondents' motion for 
summary judgment, quieting title to 'Howard 
C. Sharp, Max W. Steele and Steven W. 
Bergstedt, Trustees of the Bryner Clinic 
Employees Profit Sharing Plan' and 'Howard 
C. Sharp, Max W. Steele and Steven W. 
Bergstedt, Trustees of the Bryner Clinic, Inc. 
Employees Pension Trust' as tenants in 
common. Appellant's judgment was held not 
to have attached to the property since the deed 
was recorded more than two years prior to the 
date of judgment and because at the time the 
judgment was entered, AFCO had no interest 
in the property. On appeal, appellant requests 
that this Court reverse and hold that the 1979 
deed is a nullity conveying no priority to res-
pondents. 
Appellant argues that the grantee of a deed 
must be a natural or artificial person capable 
of taking and holding title to property. Bums 
v. GrMblc, 138 Cai. App. 2d 280, 291 P.2d 969 
(1956), and that if no such person exists, att-
empted conveyances are deemed 'mere nulli-
ties.' Nilsoa v. Hamilton, 53 Utah 594, 174 P. 
624 (1918). He claims that trusts are property 
interests which cannot hold property. We 
agree and vacate the summary judgment. 
An attempted conveyance of land to a 
nonexisting entity is void. See Nilson v. 
Hamilton, 53 Utah at 600, 174 P. at 626, 
where we held that a deed which named a 
deceased person or his estate as a grantee was 
void because neither the estate nor the dece-
ased person was a legal entity. See also Rixford 
v. Zciglcr, 150 Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092, 
1093 (1907), where it is said: 
[A] deed of conveyance is void 
unless the grantee named is capable 
of taking and holding the property 
named in the deed; and the general 
rule also is that to make a deed 
effective the grantee must be a 
person, either natural or artificial, 
capable of taking and holding the 
property. 
For coMpfcte Utah Code Annotations, 
Since the deed here named a nonentity as the 
grantee, we cannot agree with the trial court 
that the deed did not contain 'a material 
defect." The deed conveyed no interest what-
ever. 
Respondents, in their amended complaint, 
sought as alternative relief reformation of the 
deed so as to substitute the trustees as the 
grantees of the deed. However, the trial court 
did not reach the claim for reformation or 
make any ruling thereon since it incorrectly 
concluded that the naming of the trust as the 
grantee was not a material defect. Because the 
grantee was a nonentity, the defect was mat-
erial. 
The summary judgment quieting title in 
respondents is vacated, and the case is rema-
nded to the trial court for a determination of 
respondents' claim for reformation, subject to 
any defenses appellant may raise thereto. 
Durham, Justice, having disqualified 
herself, does not participate herein. 
1. Other judgment creditors of AFCO were also 
joined as party-defendants. All of the other defe-
ndants have either executed a disclaimer of interest 
in the property or have defaulted by failing to 
answer the complaint. 
Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Wayne TRIPP, dba Modern DrywaJI, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Jeff VAUGHN, dba Jeff Vaughn 
Construction, et a!., 
Defendants. 
Basin State Bank, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Lincove Partnership, Richard L. Buchanan 
and Lucille Buchanan, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Before Judges Greenwood, Onne and 
Jackson. 
No. S60129-CA 
FILED: December 2, 1987 
SEVENTH DISTRICT 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson 
ATTORNEYS: 
Thomas R. Patton for Appellants. 
Kenneth G. Anderton for Respondent. 
consnlt CodeoCo'i Annotation Service 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD* 
Lincove Partnership (*Lincove*) appeals 
from the trial court's consolidation of case 
nos. 12,342 and 12,251, the denial of its 
motion to allow a counterclaim, bring in third 
party defendants and set aside a partial 
summary judgment, and the trial court's 
admission of hearsay. We affirm in part and 
remand. 
The procedural background of this case is 
central to this appeal, and is, therefore, set 
forth in detail. Lincove executed a trust deed 
and trust deed note whereby it agreed to pay 
Basin State Bank $1,120,000 with interest for 
the purchase of a subdivision ('the property*) 
which collateralized the loan. The note prov-
ided that in the event of default, the entire 
sum would become due and payable. After the 
trust deed was recorded, Wayne Tripp and 
others performed work on the property. On 
July 27, 1983, Wayne Tripp filed an action in 
case no. 12,251 against Jeff Vaughn, Lincove, 
Basin State Bank and various lienholders, 
seeking to foreclose his mechanic's lien on the 
property. On August 29, 1983 attorneys 
Charles Abbott and Brent Jensen answered the 
complaint on behalf of Jeff Vaughn and 
Lincove. On September 22, 1983, Basin State 
Bank filed a foreclosure action against 
Lincove and others in case no. 12,342. 
On November 18, 1983, Basin State Bank 
filed a motion to consolidate the two cases. A 
notice of the hearing on thfc motion to cons-
olidate was sent to Charles Abbott as attorney 
for Lincove on November 22, 1983. The 
motion was heard on November 30, 1983, and 
the coutf ordered the cases consolidated. 
DeLoy Salknback filed an answer in Basin 
State Bank's foredoture action on behalf of 
two Lincove partners on January 9, 1984. On 
December 5, 1984 the court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Wayne Tripp 
and others, against Lincove and general part-
ners Richard L. Buchanan, Robert King and 
DeVerl Byington, finding they had failed to 
file or obtain a bond as required by Utah 
Code Ann. {14-2-1. On December 27, 
1984, Kenneth Clarke, a law partner of Mr. 
Salknback, attended a trial on behalf of 
Lincove, where the priority of the lienholders 
was litigated. Trial on the remaining issues 
was set for February 1, 1985. On January 15, 
1985, Mr. Clarke, filed an entry of appearance 
of counsel, a motion to bring in third party 
defendants and a motion to allow a counter-
claim. Mr. Clarke filed an affidavit with his 
motions, citing his short period of time on the 
case, his heavy workload and his family pro-
blems as the reasons the court should grant 
the motions. On January 21, 1985, Mr. Clarke 
filed a motion to continue the trial. The trial 
was continued until March 19, 1985. On 
February 1, 1985, Lincove filed a motion to 
set aside the partial summary judgment in 
favor of Wayne Tripp. 
On March 19, 1985, the court denied the 
motion to set aside the partial summary jud-
gment, motion to bring in third party defen-
dants and motion to allow a counterclaim, and 
the trial was held. At trial, the executive vice 
president of Basin State Bank testified that the 
accrued interest due on the $1,120,000 loan 
was $366,300.47. Lincove's attorney objected 
to the testimony on the grounds that it was 
hearsay. The court allowed the testimony into 
evidence under the business records exception 
to the hearsay rule. At the conclusion of the 
trial, the court found that Basin State Bank 
had priority over afl other liens and ordered 
foreclosure of the property. 
Lincove raises the following issues on 
appeal: 1) whether Basin State Bank gave 
timely notice of the consolidation of the cases 
to Lincove; 2) whether the court erred in 
denying Lincove's motions to allow a count-
erclaim and to bring in third party defendants; 
3) whether the court erred in denying 
Lincove's motion to set aside the partial 
summary judgment; and 4) whether the court 
erred in admitting the bank officer's testi-
mony into evidence. 
I. 
Lincove's first claim on appeal is that Basin 
State Bank failed to provide it with timely 
notice of the motion to consolidate and the 
nature of the hearing on March 19, 1985. 
Notice, to be adequate, must be reasonably 
calculated to apprise interested persons of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections. Nelson 
v. Jaootoen, 669 P 2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983). 
The notice must "adequately (inform] the 
parties of the specific issues they must prepare 
to meet/ Id. at 1213. 
On November 22, 1983, notice of the 
hearing on the motion to consolidate was sent 
to Charles Abbott as attorney for Lincove. 
Therefore, Lincove received timely notice of 
that hearing. Further, a notice of the March 
19, 1985 hearing was sent to Mr. Salknback as 
counsel for Lincove on March 6, 1985. The 
notice stated that the hearing would address 
the foreclosure of Basin State Bank's trust 
deed. Lincove clearly received adequate notice 
of the hearing on March 19, 1985 and the 
issues it would be required to meet. Therefore, 
we find that Basin State Bank provided 
Lincove with timely notice of the motion to 
consolidate and the hearing on March 19, 
1985. 
n. 
Lincove also contends that the court erred 
in denying Lincove's motions to allow a 
For Utah Code Aaaotatfoat, an t CodeoCo'i 
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oounterdaim and to bring in third party def-
endants. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure a compulsory counterclaim shall be 
filed and a permissive counterclaim may be 
filed within the twenty days allowed for filing 
the answer. Utah R. Ov. P. 12(a), 13(a) and 
(b). However, '(wjhen a pleader fails to set up 
a oounterdaim through oversight, inadvert-
ence, or excusable neglect, or when justice 
requires, he may by leave of court set up the 
counterclaim by amendment/ Utah R. Ov. P. 
13(e). 
A defendant, as third party plaintiff, may 
serve a third party defendant with a summons 
and complaint and need not obtain leave to 
make the service 'if he fiks the third-party 
complaint not later than ten days after he 
serves his original answer. Otherwise he must 
obtain leave on motion upon notice to all 
parties to the action.* Utah R. Civ. P. 14(a). 
Further, Utah R. Ov. P. 15(a) provides that a 
party who has not amended his pleadings 
within the time provided for in the rule, may 
amend his pleading 'only by leave of court or 
by written consent of the adverse party; and 
leave shall be fredy given when justice so 
requires/ 
In interpreting Rule 15(a), the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that 'the granting 
of leave to amend is a matter which lies within 
the broad discretion of the court, and its 
rulings are not to be disturbed in the absence 
of a showing of an abuse of discretion resul-
ting in prejudice to the complaining party/ 
Okmd v. Appkby, 660 P.2d 245, 24* (Utah 
1983). In Utah, the rule is 'to allow amend-
ments fredy where justice requires, and espe-
cially is this true before trial/ GUImMn v. 
Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 PJ2d 1045, 1046 
(1971). The Utah Supreme Court applied this 
rule in Gfranf where the motion to amend was 
not made until the day of trial and proposed 
new and different causes of action. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion 
to amend where the plaintiff was unable to 
state an adequate reason for the untimely 
motion and defendants claimed they would be 
prejudiced in their defense. 
In this case, the consolidated actions were 
commenced in the summer and fall of 1983. In 
January 1984, Mr. SaDenback, u counsel for 
linoove, Richard L. Buchanan and DeVerl 
Byington, filed an answer to the complaint. 
Thirteen months later and two weeks before 
the scheduled trial date, Mr. Clarke, on behalf 
of Lincove, filed the motion to allow a coun-
terclaim and motion to bring in third party 
defendants. Mr. Clarke attached an affidavit 
to the motions which explained that he had 
only been counsel on the case since December 
17, 1984, and that his workload and family 
problems limited his ability to give the case his 
immediate attention. However, the motions 
failed to explain the thirteen month delay 
Wm caaplsls Ufh Cads Aaastadiis, 
between filing the answer and filing these 
motions. Although Mr. Clarke had only been 
npmenfing the parties for a short period of 
time, his partner, Mr. Salknback, had filed 
Lincove's answer and had ample time to file 
the counterclaim and third party complaint. In 
addition, Lincove has failed to demonstrate 
with any particularity whatsoever that the 
court's failure to allow the amendments to the 
pleadings resulted in prejudice. Therefore, we 
find that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying the motions to allow a 
counterclaim and to bring in third party def-
endants which were filed two weeks before the 
scheduled trial date, where inadequate reasons 
for the untimely motion were presented and 
where the parties failed to demonstrate that 
the court's denial of the motions resulted in 
prejudice. 
in. 
The third issue is whether the court erred in 
denying Lincove's motion to set aside the 
partial summary judgment. In reviewing the 
court's original grant of summary judgment, 
we apply 'the same analytical standard incu-
mbent upon the trial court: the grant of such a 
motion (or the affirmance thereof) is appro-
priate only where there exist no genuine issues 
of fact relevant to the disposition of the claim 
underlying the motion/ L St A Dtywnll, Inc. 
v. Whitmorc Constr. Co.. 608 P.2d 626, 628 
(Utah 1980). 
On December 5, 1984, the trial court 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
Wayne Tripp and four defendants and against 
Lincove in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
{14-2-1 (1986). Recording to Utah Code 
Ann. (14-2-1, 
the owner of any interest in land 
entering into a contract, involving 
S2,000 or more, for the construc-
tion ... of any building, structure, 
or improvement upon land shall, 
before any work is commenced, 
obtain from the contractor a bond 
in a sum equal to the contract price 
.... Any person who has ... perfo-
rmed labor for or upon any such 
building ... or improvement, for 
which payment has not been made, 
has a direct right of action against 
the sureties upon such bond ... for 
the reasonable value of the mater-
ials furnished, or for labor perfo-
rmed, not exceeding the prices 
agreed upon. 
Lincove did not dispute its failure to obtain 
a bond and did not oppose that portion of the 
motion for summary judgment. The court 
granted summary judgment only with regard 
to Lincove's failure to obtain the bond. On 
February 5, 1985, Lincove filed a motion to 
set aside the partial summary judgment purs-
Cadt*Ca's daaifttia tovies 
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uant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(h). Supporting 
affidavits were filed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. 
Salknback. Mr. Salknbnck's affidavit stated 
he had received the various motions for 
summary judgment and that Richard and 
Lucille Buchanan and DeVerl Byington were 
"never apprised in the material developments 
on the project insofar as monies claimed by 
the subcontractors." Mr. Clarke's affidavit 
did not address whether disputed issues of 
material fact existed nor even the factual basis 
for the partial summary judgment. These 
documents fail to demonstrate that genuine 
issues of material fact existed precluding the 
grant of partial summary judgment. There-
fore, we find no error in the court's refusal to 
set aside the partial summary judgment. 
IV. 
The fourth issue is whether the trial court 
erred in allowing into evidence the bank 
officer's testimony regarding the amount of 
interest due on the $1,120,000. loan. Lincove 
claims that the testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay. However, the trial judge admitted the 
testimony into evidence under the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testif-
ying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). Business records which 
satisfy the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 
803(6) will not be excluded as hearsay. Utah 
R. Evid. 803(6) states: 
Records of regularly conducted 
activity. A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or 
near the time by ... a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of 
a regularly conducted business act-
ivity, and if it was the regular pra-
ctice of that business activity to 
make the ... data compilation, all as 
shown by the testimony of the 
custodian.... 
At trial, Howard Carroll, executive vice 
president of Basin State Bank testified that the 
total interest due and owing on the $1,200,000 
loan was $336,330.47. Mr. Carroll testified 
that several lending institutions participated in 
the loan in differing amounts. Each lender 
submitted its computations to him over the 
telephone, and Mr. Carroll compiled the 
amounts. Mr. Carroll's testimony regarding 
each lender's computations of interest cannot 
qualify as a business records exception. The 
rule applies to written documents such as 
memoranda, records or reports and by its 
terms does not include oral statements. 
Further, it has generally been assumed in the 
judicial phrasing of the rule that the statement 
Far coaplrtt Utah C o * AiotadsM, 
admissible under the rale must be written. 
Wigmon on Evidence (1528 (3d cd 1974). 
Finally, the Utah courts have consistently 
applied the rule to written assertions. Suae v. 
Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 683 (Utah IMS); Kehl 
v. Scbwcaduum, 735 PJd 413, 416 (Utah 
App. 1987). In this case* no written data 
compilation or record indicating the amount 
of interest due on the loan was submitted at 
trial. Therefore, the trial court erred in allo-
wing the oral testimony into evidence as a 
business records exception. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed 
but the matter is remanded to the trial court 
with instructions to vacate the amount of 
interest due on the loan and award interest 
calculated at the legal rate as provided in Utah 
Code Ann, §15-1-4(1986). 
Affirmed in part and remanded for entry of 
amended judgment. 
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Ctoeat 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Jndge: 
Plaintiff appeals from the Industrial Com-
mission's denial of her application for une-
mployment compensation. We reverse and 
remand. 
Plaintiff, Barbara A. DeLuca, began 
working for Deseret Medical, Inc. on Nove-
mber 21, 1963. During her employment she 
developed and was treated for a panic and 
ceasalt C*tft«Ce*s Aanelaflea Ssrvke 
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